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ABSTRACT
ISSUE: The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 eliminated the financial penalty 
of the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate. States could reinstate 
a similar penalty to encourage health insurance enrollment, ensuring 
broad sharing of health care costs across healthy and sick populations to 
stabilize the marketplaces.
GOAL: To provide state-by-state estimates of the impact on insurance 
coverage, premiums, and mandate penalty revenues if the state were to 
adopt an individual mandate.
METHODS: Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model 
(HIPSM) is used to estimate the coverage and cost impacts of state-
specific individual mandates. We assume each state adopts an individual 
mandate similar to the ACA’s.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION: If all states implemented individual 
mandates, the number of uninsured would be lower by 3.9 million in 
2019 and 7.5 million in 2022. On average, marketplace premiums would 
be 11.8 percent lower in 2019. State mandate penalty revenues would 
amount to $7.4 billion and demand for uncompensated care would be 
$11.4 billion lower. The impact on coverage and on premiums varies in 
significant ways across states. For example, in 2019, the number of people 
uninsured would be 19 percent lower in Colorado and 10 percent lower 
in California if they implemented their own mandates. With mandates 
in place, average premiums would be 4 percent lower in Alaska and 15 
percent lower in Washington.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
  States can implement their own 
individual insurance mandates to 
replace the federal mandate, as 
Massachusetts and New Jersey 
have done already. If all remaining 
states implemented individual 
mandates, the number of 
uninsured would fall by 3.9 million 
in 2019 and 7.5 million in 2022.
  With individual mandates in 
place in every state, marketplace 
premiums would fall by 11.8 
percent on average in 2019. 
  Changes in health insurance 
coverage and premium rates 
would vary by state. Premiums 
would decrease by 21 percent in 
New Mexico but by less than 5 
percent in Alaska. The number of 
uninsured people would decrease 
by 19 percent in Colorado and by 
10 percent in California.
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BACKGROUND
One of the Affordable Care Act’s central aims was to reform  
insurance markets by sharing health care risks and costs 
more broadly across the healthy and sicker populations. 
Strategies to accomplish this goal include modified 
community rating, guaranteed issue, and benefit 
standards, with the greatest changes made to nongroup 
insurance markets. Spreading risks tends to decrease 
costs for people with medical needs and increase them 
for healthy people. As a consequence, financial incentives 
to become and remain insured regardless of health 
status are necessary to ensure the risk pool is large and 
stable. The ACA established the individual responsibility 
requirement — also referred to as the individual 
mandate — to require most people to enroll in minimum 
essential health care coverage or pay a tax penalty. The 
Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 sets the ACA’s penalties for 
individuals who remain uninsured to $0, beginning in 2019.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that 
eliminating the individual mandate penalties would lead 
to an additional 3 million uninsured people in 2019.1 It 
also estimated that premiums in the nongroup insurance 
market will increase by 15 percent between 2018 and 
2019. Because of the elimination of mandate penalties, 
fewer healthy people are estimated to enroll in nongroup 
insurance; thus, the average nongroup insurance enrollee 
will be more likely to have higher health care expenses. 
As a result, premiums will be higher. Other pending 
changes, such as expansion of short-term, limited-
duration plans, are expected to worsen the nongroup 
risk pool and increase premiums as well. The changes, 
taken together, may lead to some insurers ending or 
limiting their participation in ACA-compliant nongroup 
insurance markets.2 Acting on these concerns, some states 
have considered or passed legislation to implement state-
specific individual mandates.3 New Jersey enacted its 
individual mandate on May 30, 2018;4 Massachusetts did so 
in 2006, well before the passage of the ACA.
This analysis provides estimates of the effects of state-
specific individual mandates on insurance coverage, 
nongroup insurance premiums, federal and state 
government spending (including penalty revenue to 
states), and demand for uncompensated care. Findings 
are provided nationally as if every state adopted its own 
individual mandate and for 48 states and the District of 
Columbia (but excluding Massachusetts and New Jersey 
because they have their own mandates under current law), 
assuming each state adopts a penalty structure similar to 
that of the ACA. We do not anticipate every state taking 
this approach, but present findings this way for ease of 
exposition and as a reference point for understanding the 
effects of the mandate. (A full description of our methods 
is available below.)
KEY FINDINGS
Our central estimates assume that state mandates are 
implemented in each state as soon as the federal penalties 
are eliminated in 2019. The effect of a mandate grows over 
time as health care costs grow relative to incomes; we 
show some of our results in 2022 to illustrate this. State 
mandates would have two central effects. First, more 
people would retain insurance coverage to avoid the 
penalty. Second, premiums in the nongroup market would 
be lower because the insurance pool will not lose healthy 
people that would otherwise drop their coverage without 
a mandate. As a result, even more people will enroll 
because of the lower premiums.
National Distribution of Health Insurance 
Coverage, 2019
If all states adopted a mandate, the number of uninsured 
would fall by 3.9 million people, a decrease of 11.4 
percent (Exhibit 1). The uninsured rate would decline 
from 12.4 percent of the nonelderly (i.e., under age 65) 
to 11.0 percent. About 452,000 additional people would 
enroll in employer-sponsored insurance (through their 
own employer or a family member’s) with the mandates 
in place. Another 1.2 million people would enroll in 
nongroup coverage with subsidies. Another 1.7 million 
people would enroll in marketplace or nonmarketplace 
nongroup coverage without federal subsidies. Finally, 
623,000 additional people would enroll in Medicaid 
or the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). In 
most cases, these will be children; when parents apply 
for marketplace coverage, they find out their children 
are eligible for Medicaid or CHIP. (See box below for 
comparison with CBO estimates.)
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Health Insurance Coverage by Income, 2019
For people with incomes below 138 percent of the federal 
poverty level,5 the number of uninsured would fall by 
582,000 people, or 3.8 percent, with the state mandates in 
place (Exhibit 2). The relatively small effect in this group, 
a 0.7 percentage-point drop in the share of nonelderly 
people uninsured, occurs because most people in this 
cohort are eligible for Medicaid or large marketplace 
subsidies, depending on where they live. Since they are 
eligible for free or very-low-cost insurance with minor or 
no out-of-pocket requirements and most are exempt from 
the individual mandate because of income level, they are 
the least likely to drop coverage when the federal penalties 
end and the least likely to take it up when a state penalty is 
put in place.
Among people with incomes between 138 percent and 
400 percent of poverty, 1.8 million fewer people would be 
uninsured with the state mandates in place, a reduction 
of 12.7 percent. People in this income group are eligible 
for marketplace subsidies in every state if no one in the 
family has access to affordable employer coverage, they 
are not eligible for other public health insurance, and they 
are legal residents. About two-thirds of the 1.8 million 
additional insured would take up nongroup insurance 
coverage. The remainder would be roughly split between 
people enrolling in Medicaid or CHIP (mostly children 
who would enroll in CHIP) and employer-sponsored 
insurance. People who are only eligible for smaller 
marketplace subsidies — that is, those at the higher end of 
the income scale — or ineligible for subsidies are the most 
likely to be affected by a mandate, meaning they are most 
likely to become uninsured or face significantly larger 
premiums to retain coverage.
For those with incomes above 400 percent of poverty, 
1.5 million fewer people would be uninsured with the 
state mandates in place, a decrease of 33.4 percent. In 
this income group, about 78 percent of the otherwise 
uninsured would take up nongroup insurance coverage 
with the state mandates. Almost all of the remainder 
would enroll in employer-sponsored insurance coverage.
Exhibit 1. Health Insurance Coverage Distribution of the Nonelderly (thousands of people), 2019 
Current Law Compared to Scenario with Individual Mandate Adopted in Each State
Data: Urban Institute analysis of its Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM) 2018. Reform simulated in 2019.
Current law




Insured 240,186 87.6% 244,093 89.0% 3,907 1.4%
Employer 148,665 54.2% 149,117 54.4% 452 0.2%
Nongroup (with tax credits) 7,999 2.9% 9,152 3.3% 1,153 0.4%
Nongroup (without tax credits) 6,005 2.2% 7,684 2.8% 1,679 0.6%
Medicaid/CHIP 68,944 25.1% 69,567 25.4% 623 0.2%
Other (including Medicare) 8,574 3.1% 8,574 3.1% 0 0.0%
Uninsured 34,130 12.4% 30,223 11.0% –3,907 –1.4%
Total 274,316 100.0% 274,316 100.0% 0 0.0%
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Exhibit 2. Distribution of Health Insurance Coverage (thousands of people) by Income Group, 2019 
Current Law Compared to Scenario with Individual Mandate Adopted in Each State
Data: Urban Institute analysis of its Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM) 2018. Reform simulated in 2019.
Note: FPL = federal poverty level.
Panel A. Nonelderly with Income Under 138% FPL
Current law




Insured 72,529 82.5% 73,112 83.1% 582 0.7%
Employer 13,768 15.7% 13,608 15.5% –161 –0.2%
Nongroup (with tax credits) 1,806 2.1% 2,085 2.4% 279 0.3%
Nongroup (without tax credits) 683 0.8% 868 1.0% 185 0.2%
Medicaid/CHIP 53,522 60.9% 53,802 61.2% 279 0.3%
Other (including Medicare) 2,750 3.1% 2,750 3.1% 0 0.0%
Uninsured 15,421 17.5% 14,838 16.9% –582 –0.7%
Total 87,950 100.0% 87,950 100.0% 0 0.0%
Panel B. Nonelderly with Income of 138%–400% FPL
Current law




Insured 90,572 86.5% 92,373 88.2% 1,801 1.7%
Employer 64,927 62.0% 65,219 62.3% 292 0.3%
Nongroup (with tax credits) 6,193 5.9% 7,067 6.7% 874 0.8%
Nongroup (without tax credits) 1,676 1.6% 1,976 1.9% 300 0.3%
Medicaid/CHIP 13,904 13.3% 14,239 13.6% 335 0.3%
Other (including Medicare) 3,872 3.7% 3,872 3.7% 0 0.0%
Uninsured 14,147 13.5% 12,346 11.8% –1,801 –1.7%
Total 104,719 100.0% 104,719 100.0% 0 0.0%
Panel C. Nonelderly with Income Above 400% FPL
Current law




Insured 77,084 94.4% 78,608 96.3% 1,524 1.9%
Employer 69,969 85.7% 70,290 86.1% 321 0.4%
Nongroup (with tax credits) 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Nongroup (without tax credits) 3,646 4.5% 4,841 5.9% 1,195 1.5%
Medicaid/CHIP 1,517 1.9% 1,526 1.9% 9 0.0%
Other (including Medicare) 1,952 2.4% 1,952 2.4% 0 0.0%
Uninsured 4,563 5.6% 3,039 3.7% –1,524 –1.9%
Total 81,647 100.0% 81,647 100.0% 0 0.0%
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Health Insurance Coverage by State, 2019
With its own mandate in place, California would see a 
reduction of 389,000 uninsured (10.3%) in 2019 (Exhibits 
3 and 4). About 60 percent of this decrease is attributable 
to otherwise uninsured people enrolling in nongroup 
coverage. There also would be an increase in Medicaid and 
CHIP coverage of 167,000 people.
In New York, the number of uninsured would fall by 
142,000, with the bulk coming from people taking up 
nongroup coverage. The effect in New York is smaller in 
percentage terms than in many other states because the 
state offers the Essential Plan (a Basic Health Program), 
with lower premiums and cost-sharing for people 
between 138 percent and 200 percent of poverty. This 
plan already encourages greater retention of coverage, 
regardless of mandates.
In Texas, the number of uninsured people would fall 
by 483,000. We estimate that 410,000 more people 
would enroll in nongroup coverage, and 48,000 more 
would enroll in employer coverage. Texas has not 
expanded Medicaid eligibility under the ACA and has 
not aggressively undertaken marketplace outreach and 
enrollment assistance. As a result, coverage gains have 
been smaller than average. The effects of reinstating the 
mandate would be relatively small as well.
Beyond Massachusetts and New Jersey, two states — 
Hawaii and Vermont — and the District of Columbia have 
explored implementing their own individual mandates. 
They would see reductions in the number of uninsured 
residents of 8,000, 4,000, and 5,000, respectively.
Exhibit 3. Percent Change in Number of Uninsured Following Implementation of a State Individual 
Mandate, 2019
Source: Linda J. Blumberg, Matthew Buettgens, and John Holahan, How Would State–Based Individual Mandates Affect Health Insurance Coverage 






Percent Change in Number of ninsured Following Implementation of a 
State Individual Mandate, 2019
Exhibit 3
Data: Urban Institute analysis of its Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM) 2018. Reform simulated in 2019.
Note: New Jersey and Vermont have both recently passed legislation; Vermont’s legislation requires specification of the penalties during the course of 2019 with implementation in 2020. 
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maryland, and Washington have all considered or are continuing to consider their own legislation. See Dania Palanker, Rachel Schwab, and Justin 
Giovannelli, “State Efforts to Pass Individual Mandate Requirements Aim to Stabilize Markets and Protect Consumers,” To the Point (blog), Commonwealth Fund, June 14, 2018.























































































Data: Urban Institute analysis of its Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM) 2018. Reform simulated in 2019.
Note: New Jersey and Vermont have both recently passed legislation; Vermont’s legislation requires specification of the penalties during the course of 2019 with 
implementation in 2020. Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maryland, and Washington have all considered or are continuing to consider their own legislation. 
See Dania Palanker, Rachel Schwab, and Justin Giovannelli, “State Efforts to Pass Individual Mandate Requirements Aim to Stabilize Markets and Protect Consumers,”  
To the Point (blog), Commonwealth Fund, June 14, 2018.
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Exhibit 4. Difference and Percent Difference in Insurance Coverage (by type of coverage) by State 
(thousands of people), 2019 
Current Law Compared to Scenario with Individual Mandate Adopted in Each State
Data: Urban Institute analysis of its Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM) 2018. Reform simulated in 2019.
Note: Table excludes Massachusetts and New Jersey. Massachusetts has its own individual mandate under current law, and New Jersey’s individual mandate is expected 
to go into effect in 2019.





























Alabama 2 0.1% 42 24.4% 5 0.5% –48 –7.9%
Alaska 3 0.7% 10 70.9% 2 1.0% –14 –14.3%
Arizona 22 0.7% 67 36.7% 8 0.5% –97 –11.0%
Arkansas 4 0.3% 23 31.1% 11 1.2% –38 –16.4%
California –10 –0.1% 232 12.8% 167 1.4% –389 –10.3%
Colorado 15 0.6% 54 27.9% 32 2.5% –101 –19.2%
Connecticut 8 0.4% 17 12.0% 8 1.1% –33 –16.0%
Delaware 0 0.1% 6 21.8% 1 0.5% –7 –9.8%
District of Columbia 2 0.7% 1 6.7% 2 1.1% –5 –14.3%
Florida 24 0.3% 221 12.7% 63 1.7% –307 –11.6%
Georgia 11 0.2% 158 34.2% 13 0.7% –182 –9.9%
Hawaii 1 0.2% 7 18.1% 0 0.0% –8 –7.4%
Idaho 4 0.5% 24 21.5% 7 2.3% –35 –15.3%
Illinois 26 0.4% 102 20.4% 15 0.6% –143 –11.5%
Indiana 9 0.3% 63 32.2% 6 0.5% –78 –12.6%
Iowa 4 0.2% 15 18.7% 2 0.4% –21 –10.8%
Kansas 4 0.3% 31 24.6% 2 0.4% –38 –9.9%
Kentucky 10 0.5% 28 26.5% 15 1.1% –53 –21.2%
Louisiana 8 0.4% 42 30.2% 15 1.1% –65 –17.4%
Maine 1 0.1% 13 19.8% 1 0.3% –15 –14.1%
Maryland 10 0.3% 43 19.3% 16 1.3% –69 –15.8%
Michigan 11 0.2% 83 21.7% –4 –0.2% –90 –14.1%
Minnesota 17 0.5% 34 19.7% –4 –0.5% –46 –10.8%
Mississippi 2 0.2% 35 47.2% 2 0.3% –40 –8.8%
Missouri 9 0.3% 63 25.1% 13 1.3% –86 –12.2%
Montana 1 0.2% 9 17.9% 9 3.5% –19 –23.7%
Nebraska 5 0.5% 18 17.1% 1 0.3% –23 –11.2%
Nevada 5 0.3% 35 35.2% 14 2.2% –54 –13.3%
New Hampshire 2 0.3% 13 26.5% 1 0.5% –16 –18.8%
New Mexico 5 0.7% 18 35.8% 11 1.5% –34 –16.0%
New York 49 0.5% 93 8.0% 0 0.0% –142 –10.2%
North Carolina 12 0.3% 122 24.6% 41 2.0% –174 –12.0%
North Dakota 3 0.9% 7 16.4% 1 1.3% –11 –22.0%
Ohio 21 0.4% 93 30.4% 7 0.3% –121 –16.0%
Oklahoma 10 0.6% 53 40.2% 3 0.5% –66 –9.9%
Oregon 11 0.6% 34 21.6% 8 0.8% –53 –16.7%
Pennsylvania 23 0.4% 98 20.4% 1 0.1% –123 –16.6%
Rhode Island 1 0.2% 7 16.6% 3 1.0% –11 –19.0%
South Carolina 0 0.0% 56 28.1% 13 1.5% –70 –10.5%
South Dakota 3 0.7% 9 21.4% 0 0.3% –12 –10.8%
Tennessee 4 0.1% 60 24.6% 38 2.7% –103 –12.5%
Texas 48 0.4% 410 37.2% 25 0.5% –483 –8.9%
Utah 11 0.6% 29 13.2% 2 0.5% –42 –11.3%
Vermont 1 0.3% 3 9.6% 0 0.0% –4 –12.6%
Virginia 19 0.4% 112 26.8% 6 0.6% –137 –12.3%
Washington 13 0.4% 63 27.8% 28 1.7% –104 –16.9%
West Virginia 1 0.2% 14 53.8% 9 1.8% –24 –22.4%
Wisconsin 7 0.2% 48 18.5% 3 0.3% –58 –12.7%
Wyoming 1 0.5% 11 47.6% 0 0.7% –13 –15.9%
Total 452 0.3% 2,832 21.3% 623 0.9% –3,907 –11.7%
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Marketplace Premiums, 2019
Exhibit 5 shows the changes in marketplace premiums 
by state that would result from each state implementing 
an individual mandate. We use monthly benchmark 
single premiums for a 40-year-old to illustrate the effect, 
although the percentage change in premiums would 
be the same for any age and any coverage level because 
of the ACA’s fixed age-rating curves and uniform risk 
pool. On average, the state mandates would reduce 
marketplace premiums by 11.8 percent if all states 
adopted the ACA’s federal individual mandate structure. 
The impact of the mandate varies somewhat across states 
(Exhibit 6). States with larger shares of healthy people 
who have enrolled in coverage under the ACA because 
of the mandate will experience larger premium declines 
if it is reinstituted at the state level. For example, states 
with more people who either receive small tax credits 
or no credits (based on higher income levels) will tend 
to have large declines. This is because enrollees who pay 
the full premium themselves tend to have lower health 
care expenses than those getting tax credits. In turn, 
people in better health and those who have to pay more 
for coverage are most likely to go uninsured without a 
mandate.
States with the highest marketplace enrollment rates 
tended to attract healthier enrollees even among those 
eligible for tax credits. Therefore, the average health 
care risk of the subsidized populations varies by state 
and will lead to differential individual mandate effects. 
Because of their Basic Health Programs, New York and 
Minnesota can be expected to see less of an effect in their 
marketplaces if a mandate were implemented. States 
with small nongroup insurance markets are likely to 
experience large effects from changes in the number of 
enrollees. Premiums would decrease by 21.1 percent in 
New Mexico and by 15 percent or more in Colorado, the 
District of Columbia, Kentucky, Nevada, North Dakota, 
Washington, and West Virginia. Premiums would fall 
by less than 10 percent in Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, New York, and Wisconsin.
Exhibit 5. Marketplace Monthly Single Premium 
for a 40-Year-Old Adult, Current Law and with 
State Individual Mandates, 2019
Data: Urban Institute analysis of its Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model 
(HIPSM) 2018. Reform simulated in 2019.
Notes: Monthly premium amounts are rounded to the nearest $10. Table 
excludes Massachusetts and New Jersey. Massachusetts has its own individual 
mandate under current law, and New Jersey’s individual mandate is expected to 
go into effect in 2019.
Current law




Alabama  $630  $550 –13.5%
Alaska  $760  $730 –4.4%
Arizona  $580  $510 –12.2%
Arkansas  $410  $360 –13.9%
California  $470  $410 –12.4%
Colorado  $510  $430 –15.5%
Connecticut  $590  $530 –10.2%
Delaware  $670  $590 –11.6%
District of Columbia  $360  $300 –16.0%
Florida  $530  $470 –11.1%
Georgia  $560  $490 –13.2%
Hawaii  $500  $460 –8.4%
Idaho  $530  $470 –12.2%
Illinois  $560  $490 –12.3%
Indiana  $390  $330 –14.9%
Iowa  $850  $740 –12.2%
Kansas  $550  $480 –13.1%
Kentucky  $470  $390 –16.7%
Louisiana  $540  $490 –10.7%
Maine  $630  $560 –10.7%
Maryland  $520  $450 –13.5%
Michigan  $420  $360 –12.5%
Minnesota  $420  $380 –9.1%
Mississippi  $540  $500 –7.5%
Missouri  $580  $510 –11.3%
Montana  $580  $520 –11.1%
Nebraska  $860  $750 –12.5%
Nevada  $540  $460 –15.5%
New Hampshire  $540  $460 –13.7%
New Mexico  $490  $380 –21.1%
New York  $550  $490 –9.9%
North Carolina  $690  $610 –11.7%
North Dakota  $360  $300 –15.4%
Ohio  $410  $360 –13.1%
Oklahoma  $730  $650 –11.0%
Oregon  $450  $390 –13.4%
Pennsylvania  $590  $520 –12.8%
Rhode Island  $360  $310 –14.5%
South Carolina  $580  $520 –10.7%
South Dakota  $560  $490 –12.5%
Tennessee  $830  $730 –12.2%
Texas  $460  $400 –13.6%
Utah  $620  $540 –12.7%
Vermont  $570  $500 –11.4%
Virginia  $590  $530 –11.4%
Washington  $390  $330 –15.1%
West Virginia  $600  $510 –15.0%
Wisconsin  $590  $540 –9.7%
Wyoming  $970  $860 –11.4%
Total $530 $470 –11.8%
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Federal and State Health Care Spending, 2019
The flow of federal dollars would increase to most states 
as more people enrolled in Medicaid or took advantage of 
marketplace premium tax credits (Exhibit 7). In general, 
with more coverage, there is more federal spending. 
However, in 21 states, federal spending actually declines 
if there is a mandate in place because of a decrease in 
premiums due to healthier people enrolling in nongroup 
coverage. With a mandate, average premiums would 
decrease with the entrance of healthier people into the 
market, and since the premium subsidies are computed 
based on a standard premium, the average subsidy would 
fall at the same time. In these 21 states, the lower average 
premium subsidies offset the fact that larger numbers 
of subsidized people enroll and federal spending drops 
somewhat. As a result, relative to current law, federal 
health care spending in California would decrease by 
$356 million, or 0.7 percent, in Florida by $690 million or 3 
percent, and in Michigan by $137 million, or 1 percent. On 
the other hand, Louisiana would see an increase in federal 
health care spending of $92 million or 1.3 percent, and 
Texas would see an increase of $396 million or 1.4 percent.
Spending for the state-financed portion of Medicaid and 
CHIP would increase by $1.1 billion nationally in 2019 
(Exhibit 8). The changes in state spending are small in 
percentage terms across all the states, with 41 states and 
the District of Columbia experiencing an increase of  
1 percent or less.
Exhibit 6. Percent Change in Average Nongroup Premium Following Implementation of a State 
Individual Mandate, 2019
Source: Linda J. Blumberg, Matthew Buettgens, and John Holahan, How Would State–Based Individual Mandates Affect Health Insurance Coverage 






Percent Change in Average Nongroup Premium Following Implementation of a 
State Individual Mandate, 2019
Exhibit 6
Data: Urban Institute analysis of its Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM) 2018. Reform simulated in 2019.
Note: New Jersey and Vermont have both recently passed legislation; Vermont’s legislation requires specification of the penalties during the course of 2019 with implementation in 2020. 
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maryland, and Washington have all considered or are continuing to consider their own legislation. See Dania Palanker, Rachel Schwab, and Justin 
Giovannelli, “State Efforts to Pass Individual Mandate Requirements Aim to Stabilize Markets and Protect Consumers,” To the Point (blog), Commonwealth Fund, June 14, 2018.























































































Data: Urban Institute analysis of its Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM) 2018. Reform simulated in 2019.
Note: New Jersey and Vermont have both recently passed legislation; Vermont’s legislation requires specification of the penalties during the course of 2019 with 
implementation in 2020. Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maryland, and Washington have all considered or are continuing to consider their own legislation. 
See Dania Palanker, Rachel Schwab, and Justin Giovannelli, “State Efforts to Pass Individual Mandate Requirements Aim to Stabilize Markets and Protect Consumers,”  
To the Point (blog), Commonwealth Fund, June 14, 2018.
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Exhibit 7. Federal Spending ($ millions) 
Current Law Compared to Scenario with Individual Mandate Adopted in Each State
Data: Urban Institute analysis of its Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM) 2018. Reform simulated in 2019.
Note: Table excludes Massachusetts and New Jersey. Massachusetts has its own individual mandate under current law, and New Jersey’s individual mandate is expected 
to go into effect in 2019.



















Alabama 3,695 1,287 4,982 3,718 1,261 4,979 –3 –0.1%
Alaska 1,067 113 1,180 1,076 152 1,227 47 4.0%
Arizona 9,623 830 10,453 9,693 884 10,577 124 1.2%
Arkansas 4,937 258 5,195 4,994 252 5,246 51 1.0%
California 42,738 6,856 49,594 43,239 5,999 49,238 –356 –0.7%
Colorado 5,328 468 5,796 5,413 492 5,905 109 1.9%
Connecticut 4,225 630 4,854 4,256 566 4,822 –32 –0.7%
Delaware 1,222 160 1,382 1,228 153 1,382 –1 0.0%
District of Columbia 1,404 5 1,409 1,417 5 1,422 13 0.9%
Florida 13,777 9,419 23,196 14,020 8,486 22,507 –690 –3.0%
Georgia 7,788 2,884 10,672 7,851 2,924 10,775 103 1.0%
Hawaii 973 124 1,097 974 136 1,110 13 1.2%
Idaho 1,451 519 1,970 1,481 511 1,993 22 1.1%
Illinois 7,735 2,107 9,842 7,791 1,994 9,785 –58 –0.6%
Indiana 8,061 476 8,537 8,110 461 8,571 34 0.4%
Iowa 3,069 536 3,605 3,080 546 3,626 21 0.6%
Kansas 1,455 532 1,987 1,461 559 2,020 32 1.6%
Kentucky 8,356 442 8,798 8,426 453 8,879 81 0.9%
Louisiana 6,736 620 7,357 6,817 632 7,449 92 1.3%
Maine 1,405 535 1,940 1,407 490 1,897 –43 –2.2%
Maryland 6,067 794 6,861 6,120 749 6,869 9 0.1%
Michigan 13,075 1,142 14,216 13,053 1,026 14,080 –137 –1.0%
Minnesota 6,411 432 6,843 6,381 421 6,802 –41 –0.6%
Mississippi 3,964 434 4,398 3,985 554 4,539 141 3.2%
Missouri 6,641 1,484 8,125 6,714 1,574 8,288 163 2.0%
Montana 1,966 362 2,329 2,002 318 2,320 –8 –0.4%
Nebraska 930 936 1,866 932 888 1,821 –45 –2.4%
Nevada 2,815 433 3,248 2,860 413 3,272 25 0.8%
New Hampshire 841 221 1,062 843 207 1,051 –11 –1.0%
New Mexico 4,954 194 5,148 5,014 196 5,211 63 1.2%
New York 23,700 4,418 28,118 23,695 3,919 27,615 –503 –1.8%
North Carolina 11,011 4,006 15,018 11,227 3,948 15,175 157 1.0%
North Dakota 503 56 559 505 50 554 –5 –0.9%
Ohio 13,934 774 14,708 13,977 848 14,826 118 0.8%
Oklahoma 3,419 1,293 4,713 3,432 1,347 4,779 66 1.4%
Oregon 5,605 611 6,216 5,642 590 6,232 16 0.3%
Pennsylvania 14,183 2,337 16,520 14,199 2,137 16,336 –184 –1.1%
Rhode Island 1,148 82 1,230 1,158 71 1,229 –1 –0.1%
South Carolina 3,883 1,273 5,156 3,942 1,335 5,276 120 2.3%
South Dakota 568 217 785 569 211 780 –5 –0.6%
Tennessee 7,180 2,221 9,401 7,346 2,324 9,670 268 2.9%
Texas 24,360 4,856 29,216 24,476 5,136 29,612 396 1.4%
Utah 2,368 1,252 3,619 2,377 1,146 3,524 –96 –2.6%
Vermont 1,148 105 1,254 1,150 89 1,239 –15 –1.2%
Virginia 4,291 2,558 6,848 4,314 2,485 6,798 –50 –0.7%
Washington 7,594 572 8,166 7,710 554 8,264 98 1.2%
West Virginia 2,738 198 2,936 2,775 166 2,941 5 0.2%
Wisconsin 3,931 1,423 5,355 3,937 1,324 5,262 –93 –1.7%
Wyoming 310 257 567 312 272 583 16 2.9%
Total 314,586 63,740 378,327 317,100 61,255 378,354 28 0.0%
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Individual Mandate Penalties, 2019
Exhibit 9 shows the number of tax units (i.e., families) 
that would pay individual mandate penalties in each 
state and the revenue states would collect. While the 
penalty structure is assumed to be the same in each state, 
low-income states have fewer residents as a percentage 
of their total populations who would be subject to the 
mandate. In addition, low-income families who are subject 
to the mandate are assessed smaller penalties, so poorer 
states will collect less. Also, residents in some states have 
shown they are less likely to enroll in coverage when 
the mandate is in place. Nationally, in 2019, 8.8 million 
families would pay individual mandate penalties; the 
aggregate penalties would amount to $7.4 billion if every 
state instituted its own mandate. This reflects an average 
mandate penalty across all states of $830 per family. 
Average penalties per family range from a high of $1,270 
in Delaware to a low of $630 in West Virginia. The largest 
states will collect the most revenue from the penalties.
Demand for Uncompensated Care, 2019
Demand for uncompensated care would fall by $11.4 
billion nationally with the implementation of state 
mandates (Exhibit 10). Uncompensated care is paid for by 
federal and state governments as well as through in-kind 
donations of care by providers. The effect of the mandate 
on uncompensated care is directly related to the decrease 
in the number of uninsured people and the health status 
of the people getting coverage.
National Distribution of Health Insurance 
Coverage, 2022
We also estimate the changes in health insurance coverage 
that would occur in 2022 if all states adopted individual 
mandates (Exhibit 11). Restoration of the mandate 
at the state level would increase insurance coverage 
nationally by an estimated 7.5 million people in 2022. 
We estimate that the number of people with employer-
sponsored insurance would increase by 2.3 million people 
compared to there being no mandates in place (other 
than Massachusetts and New Jersey). An additional 1.5 
million people would enroll in marketplace nongroup 
coverage with tax credits, 2.7 million more would enroll 
in nongroup coverage without tax credits, and 1 million 
more would enroll in Medicaid.
Exhibit 8. State Medicaid & CHIP Spending ($ millions) 
Current Law Compared to Scenario with Individual Mandate 
Adopted in Each State
Data: Urban Institute analysis of its Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model 
(HIPSM) 2018. Reform simulated in 2019.
Note: Table excludes Massachusetts and New Jersey. Massachusetts has its own 
individual mandate under current law, and New Jersey’s individual mandate is 










Alabama 1,676 1,686 10 0.6%
Alaska 715 720 4 0.6%
Arizona 4,006 4,021 15 0.4%
Arkansas 1,538 1,549 11 0.7%
California 27,818 28,063 245 0.9%
Colorado 3,132 3,170 37 1.2%
Connecticut 2,973 2,989 16 0.5%
Delaware 737 738 2 0.2%
District of Columbia 507 509 2 0.5%
Florida 9,452 9,610 159 1.7%
Georgia 3,915 3,945 30 0.8%
Hawaii 660 661 1 0.1%
Idaho 564 576 11 2.0%
Illinois 5,863 5,873 10 0.2%
Indiana 2,758 2,767 9 0.3%
Iowa 1,601 1,603 2 0.1%
Kansas 1,050 1,054 4 0.4%
Kentucky 2,252 2,267 16 0.7%
Louisiana 2,843 2,858 14 0.5%
Maine 861 862 1 0.1%
Maryland 4,132 4,154 22 0.5%
Michigan 4,668 4,672 3 0.1%
Minnesota 4,655 4,662 7 0.1%
Mississippi 1,438 1,446 8 0.5%
Missouri 3,974 4,014 39 1.0%
Montana 636 645 9 1.4%
Nebraska 769 771 2 0.3%
Nevada 1,172 1,182 10 0.9%
New Hampshire 598 599 0 0.0%
New Mexico 1,461 1,474 13 0.9%
New York 16,704 16,708 4 0.0%
North Carolina 5,611 5,715 104 1.9%
North Dakota 297 298 1 0.3%
Ohio 6,048 6,059 11 0.2%
Oklahoma 1,922 1,929 7 0.4%
Oregon 2,049 2,057 9 0.4%
Pennsylvania 8,867 8,882 15 0.2%
Rhode Island 845 853 8 0.9%
South Carolina 1,620 1,644 24 1.5%
South Dakota 490 491 1 0.2%
Tennessee 3,711 3,788 77 2.1%
Texas 16,703 16,780 77 0.5%
Utah 975 979 4 0.4%
Vermont 679 679 0 0.1%
Virginia 4,205 4,226 21 0.5%
Washington 3,961 3,998 37 0.9%
West Virginia 794 802 8 1.0%
Wisconsin 2,666 2,670 4 0.2%
Wyoming 304 306 1 0.5%
Total 176,878 178,003 1,125 0.6%
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Exhibit 9. Number of Tax Units Paying Individual 
Mandate Penalties, Total State Penalty Revenue, 
and Average Penalty Paid per Unit Paying 
By State Assuming Mandates Adopted in Every State, 2019






collected by states 
($ millions)
Average 
paid per tax 
unit paying a 
penalty
Alabama 151  $120  $790 
Alaska 48  $48  $1,000 
Arizona 245  $206  $840 
Arkansas 78  $79  $1,010 
California 908  $920  $1,010 
Colorado 200  $163  $820 
Connecticut 57  $61  $1,070 
Delaware 21  $27  $1,270 
District of Columbia 17  $18  $1,060 
Florida 501  $402  $800 
Georgia 398  $315  $790 
Hawaii 55  $48  $870 
Idaho 57  $47  $820 
Illinois 307  $244  $790 
Indiana 176  $125  $710 
Iowa 79  $63  $800 
Kansas 99  $76  $770 
Kentucky 100  $66  $650 
Louisiana 144  $116  $810 
Maine 33  $30  $900 
Maryland 132  $116  $880 
Michigan 189  $140  $740 
Minnesota 122  $132  $1,090 
Mississippi 112  $100  $890 
Missouri 198  $144  $730 
Montana 32  $25  $790 
Nebraska 51  $53  $1,030 
Nevada 97  $70  $720 
New Hampshire 40  $33  $840 
New Mexico 72  $50  $700 
New York 284  $271  $960 
North Carolina 357  $288  $810 
North Dakota 23  $19  $840 
Ohio 281  $202  $720 
Oklahoma 179  $129  $720 
Oregon 94  $78  $830 
Pennsylvania 240  $194  $810 
Rhode Island 19  $14  $760 
South Carolina 172  $117  $680 
South Dakota 36  $31  $840 
Tennessee 232  $188  $810 
Texas 1,187  $947  $800 
Utah 63  $70  $1,110 
Vermont 12  $11  $870 
Virginia 312  $274  $880 
Washington 221  $165  $750 
West Virginia 45  $28  $630 
Wisconsin 108  $79  $730 
Wyoming 26  $21  $820 
Total 8,849  $7,384  $830 
Exhibit 10. Uncompensated Care by State ($ millions) 
Current Law Compared to Scenario with Individual Mandate 
Adopted in Each State
Data: Urban Institute analysis of its Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM) 
2018. Reform simulated in 2019.
Notes: Average penalty amounts are rounded to the nearest $10. Table excludes 
Massachusetts and New Jersey. Massachusetts has its own individual mandate under 
current law, and New Jersey’s individual mandate is expected to go into effect in 2019.
Data: Urban Institute analysis of its Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM) 
2018. Reform simulated in 2019.
Note: Table excludes Massachusetts and New Jersey. Massachusetts has its own 
individual mandate under current law, and New Jersey’s individual mandate is expected 






Alabama 1,399 1,253 –146
Alaska 268 241 –28
Arizona 1,983 1,708 –276
Arkansas 836 694 –142
California 8,141 7,249 –892
Colorado 1,575 1,283 –292
Connecticut 717 546 –170
Delaware 134 115 –19
District of Columbia 108 100 –8
Florida 5,207 4,460 –747
Georgia 3,225 2,677 –548
Hawaii 163 141 –22
Idaho 604 480 –124
Illinois 3,017 2,550 –467
Indiana 1,445 1,241 –205
Iowa 652 580 –72
Kansas 928 798 –130
Kentucky 720 549 –171
Louisiana 1,260 1,092 –168
Maine 339 310 –29
Maryland 920 702 –217
Michigan 2,244 1,826 –418
Minnesota 1,760 1,544 –216
Mississippi 1,088 950 –139
Missouri 2,044 1,749 –295
Montana 388 312 –76
Nebraska 483 417 –66
Nevada 683 560 –123
New Hampshire 237 188 –50
New Mexico 431 333 –97
New York 2,695 2,284 –411
North Carolina 2,612 2,184 –428
North Dakota 140 95 –44
Ohio 1,877 1,518 –360
Oklahoma 1,822 1,596 –227
Oregon 787 621 –166
Pennsylvania 1,807 1,388 –419
Rhode Island 100 74 –25
South Carolina 1,214 1,035 –179
South Dakota 277 231 –45
Tennessee 1,669 1,429 –241
Texas 7,974 6,773 –1,201
Utah 765 664 –101
Vermont 121 108 –13
Virginia 2,687 2,233 –454
Washington 1,674 1,257 –417
West Virginia 350 266 –84
Wisconsin 1,196 1,018 –178
Wyoming 211 176 –35
Total 72,978 61,598 –11,381
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In 2022, the largest absolute decreases in rates of 
uninsured are in large states like California, Florida, 
and Texas (Exhibit 12). As health care costs get more 
expensive relative to incomes over time, fewer people 
tend to purchase insurance and the number of uninsured 
rises. However, with an individual mandate in place, the 
effect of health care cost growth is lessened because more 
people hold on to their insurance to comply with the 
mandate. As a result, the effect of the individual mandate 
on reducing the number of people without insurance 
increases over time in percentage terms.
DISCUSSION
If they implement their own individual mandates, states 
could mitigate the negative impact the elimination of 
the ACA penalties will have on coverage and premiums. 
Massachusetts legislated its own individual mandate as 
part of its 2006 broad-based health reforms; New Jersey 
did so this year. This approach does pose significant 
challenges. For example, Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and 
Wyoming do not have state income taxes, and thus 
new structures would have to be developed to collect 
individual mandate penalties, making the arrangement 
far less feasible.
In addition, the political environment in some states has 
been actively hostile to the ACA, making the adoption 
of state mandates extremely unlikely. Even states that 
have governors and state legislators who are generally 
supportive of the ACA are likely to find it politically 
challenging to impose mandate penalties. Still, some states 
are considering such a move. In addition to the individual 
mandate law passed by New Jersey this year,6 Vermont has 
passed a bill into law but must work out penalty amounts 
and enforcement mechanisms through a working group, 
with implementation requiring further legislation. D.C.’s 
bill is still pending, but may be resolved soon. Connecticut, 
Hawaii, Maryland, and Washington considered bills. 
These are currently inactive, although there is a chance 
that other bills may be considered in the future. Other 
states may consider such a step after the consequences 
of elimination of the federal penalties become evident in 
2019.
Exhibit 11. Health Insurance Coverage Distribution of the Nonelderly (thousands of people), 2022 
Current Law Compared to Scenario with Individual Mandate Adopted in Each State
Current law




Insured 238,239 86.1% 245,736 88.8% 7,497 2.7%
Employer 147,268 53.2% 149,534 54.1% 2,266 0.8%
Nongroup (with tax credits) 7,798 2.8% 9,269 3.4% 1,471 0.5%
Nongroup (without tax credits) 5,165 1.9% 7,891 2.9% 2,726 1.0%
Medicaid/CHIP 69,389 25.1% 70,423 25.5% 1,034 0.4%
Other (including Medicare) 8,619 3.1% 8,619 3.1% 0 0.0%
Uninsured 38,416 13.9% 30,919 11.2% –7,497 –2.7%
Total 276,654 100.0% 276,654 100.0% 0 0.0%
Data: Urban Institute analysis of its Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM) 2018. Reform simulated in 2022.
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Exhibit 12. Difference and Percent Difference in Insurance Coverage (by type of coverage) by State 
(thousands of people), 2022 
Current Law Compared to Scenario with Individual Mandate Adopted in Each State
Data: Urban Institute analysis of its Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM) 2018. Reform simulated in 2022.
Note: Table excludes Massachusetts and New Jersey. Massachusetts has its own individual mandate under current law, and New Jersey’s individual mandate is expected 
to go into effect in 2019.





























Alabama 27 1.3% 55 34.3% –1 –0.1% –81 –12.3%
Alaska 12 3.1% 12 101.6% 0 0.3% –24 –21.8%
Arizona 72 2.4% 104 67.6% 18 1.0% –195 –19.4%
Arkansas 15 1.2% 35 54.4% 19 2.1% –70 –25.3%
California 110 0.7% 353 20.8% 360 3.2% –823 –19.6%
Colorado 50 2.0% 93 57.1% 66 5.2% –209 –32.8%
Connecticut 23 1.3% 32 24.7% 33 4.4% –88 –33.6%
Delaware 7 1.6% 10 42.5% 0 0.2% –18 –20.8%
District of Columbia 9 2.6% 5 38.0% 5 2.8% –19 –36.0%
Florida 123 1.6% 342 20.6% 91 2.5% –556 –18.8%
Georgia 87 1.8% 215 49.0% –4 –0.2% –298 –14.4%
Hawaii 9 1.2% 12 38.1% 1 0.3% –22 –18.8%
Idaho 17 2.2% 39 38.1% 9 3.0% –65 –24.3%
Illinois 107 1.7% 167 37.7% 18 0.7% –292 –20.9%
Indiana 35 1.1% 88 50.3% 5 0.4% –128 –18.7%
Iowa 21 1.3% 28 40.1% –2 –0.3% –47 –21.1%
Kansas 32 2.1% 48 42.6% 2 0.6% –82 –19.2%
Kentucky 29 1.7% 42 45.4% 36 2.7% –107 –34.8%
Louisiana 29 1.6% 63 53.2% –25 –1.8% –68 –15.6%
Maine 3 0.6% 17 27.3% 1 0.4% –22 –19.6%
Maryland 51 1.6% 72 35.1% 42 3.3% –164 –29.7%
Michigan 61 1.4% 115 32.9% –6 –0.3% –170 –24.1%
Minnesota 58 1.9% 62 41.3% –9 –0.9% –111 –22.4%
Mississippi 17 1.5% 43 64.1% –1 –0.1% –60 –12.7%
Missouri 64 2.2% 85 36.3% 12 1.2% –160 –20.6%
Montana 7 1.7% 18 40.2% –2 –0.6% –23 –24.0%
Nebraska 27 2.8% 30 30.5% 1 0.2% –57 –23.3%
Nevada 24 1.6% 54 60.3% 33 5.0% –110 –23.0%
New Hampshire 9 1.3% 19 44.5% 0 –0.1% –28 –29.2%
New Mexico 18 2.5% 26 60.5% 25 3.3% –68 –27.5%
New York 186 2.1% 139 12.5% 25 0.5% –350 –21.9%
North Carolina 63 1.5% 174 37.6% 75 3.6% –313 –18.8%
North Dakota 12 3.2% 13 36.8% 2 1.7% –26 –39.3%
Ohio 88 1.6% 135 51.2% 1 0.0% –224 –26.3%
Oklahoma 37 2.1% 67 53.4% 4 0.5% –107 –14.7%
Oregon 43 2.4% 58 41.5% 11 1.1% –111 –29.3%
Pennsylvania 98 1.6% 148 33.7% –25 –1.0% –220 –26.3%
Rhode Island 10 2.2% 11 28.6% 9 3.3% –30 –38.9%
South Carolina 27 1.3% 73 38.8% 21 2.3% –120 –16.4%
South Dakota 9 2.2% 16 42.1% 0 0.2% –25 –19.6%
Tennessee 33 1.2% 96 43.6% 67 4.8% –195 –20.7%
Texas 245 2.0% 576 57.8% 30 0.6% –850 –14.3%
Utah 56 3.1% 43 19.4% 2 0.6% –101 –22.5%
Vermont 4 1.4% 4 11.4% 1 0.4% –8 –22.9%
Virginia 104 2.2% 166 42.2% 8 0.8% –278 –21.3%
Washington 49 1.4% 95 47.1% 58 3.5% –201 –27.9%
West Virginia 5 0.6% 16 68.5% 15 3.0% –35 –29.7%
Wisconsin 40 1.4% 71 30.1% 3 0.3% –115 –22.3%
Wyoming 5 1.5% 15 66.3% 1 0.8% –20 –21.7%
Total 2,266 1.6% 4,197 34.3% 1,034 1.6% –7,497 –19.9%
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COMPARISON OF URBAN INSTITUTE AND 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATES
Our estimates are consistent with CBO’s 2019 
estimates of the effect of eliminating the federal 
individual mandate.* The CBO estimated that in 2019 
eliminating the individual mandate would decrease 
Medicaid coverage by approximately 1 million people 
and nongroup insurance coverage (marketplace 
and nonmarketplace) by 3 million people, and would 
increase the number of uninsured by 4 million. Our 
estimates represent an inverse effect of the same size.
The estimates presented in our analysis are essentially 
the mirror image of the types of estimates made by 
CBO. Our estimates differ somewhat from CBO’s in 
terms of the effect of eliminating the individual mandate 
in 2022. They diverge most with regard to the effect 
on Medicaid enrollment; CBO rounds coverage effects 
to the nearest 1 million people, which makes precise 
comparisons difficult. CBO estimates that elimination 
of the individual mandate would decrease Medicaid 
coverage by 4 million people in 2022, whereas we 
estimate a smaller inverse effect of 1 million additional 
people enrolling in Medicaid with state mandates in 
place. Our smaller estimate may reflect the fact that 
CBO’s baseline assumes that some states that had not 
yet expanded Medicaid under the ACA by 2017 would 
do so in future years; we make no such assumptions. 
CBO estimates a 2022 nongroup coverage effect 
from eliminating the individual mandate of 5 million 
people, compared to our estimate of 4.2 million people 
gaining coverage nationally under state mandates. 
CBO estimates that 2 million fewer people would have 
employer coverage without a mandate, compared to 
our estimate of 2.3 million people gaining employer 
coverage with state mandates. Taken together, CBO 
estimates that the number of uninsured would be 12 
million people higher in 2022 absent mandate penalties, 
compared to our estimate that 7.5 million fewer people 
would be uninsured with state mandates introduced 
across the country.
*  Congressional Budget Office, Federal Subsidies for Health Insurance 




This analysis estimates the coverage and health 
care spending effects that would occur if each state 
implemented an individual mandate to replace the 
federal penalties that will be eliminated in 2019 under 
the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. We assume that each state 
would implement a mandate with the same structure 
as the ACA’s federal mandate. Massachusetts and New 
Jersey are the only states that currently have their own 
individual mandates. Massachusetts’s requirements and 
penalties associated with its mandate are different than 
the federal requirements in the ACA. The New Jersey 
mandate structure and penalties are very similar to 
the ACA. Consequently, we exclude Massachusetts and 
New Jersey from the state-specific tables. Our analysis 
relies upon the Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy 
Simulation Model (HIPSM).
HIPSM is a detailed microsimulation model of the health 
care system designed to estimate the cost and coverage 
effects of proposed health care policy options. HIPSM is 
based on two years of the American Community Survey 
(ACS), which provides a representative sample of families 
that is large enough to produce estimates for individual 
states. The population is aged to future years using 
projections from the Urban Institute’s Mapping America’s 
Futures program. HIPSM is designed to incorporate 
timely, real-world data when they are available. As 
described below, we regularly update the model to reflect 
published Medicaid and marketplace enrollment and 
costs in each state. The enrollment experience in each 
state under current law affects how the model simulates 
policy alternatives.
HIPSM is unique among microsimulation models 
of health coverage and costs because individual and 
family decisions combine the two most common types 
of microsimulation decision-making: elasticity and 
expected utility. Decision-making follows an expected-
utility framework that captures factors such as individual 
health risk, but we add a term for each observation that 
represents factors involved in their observed choices that 
the expected-utility approach alone could not capture. 
These terms are set so the model leads to each person in 
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the data making the choice they reported in the survey, 
and the distribution of the terms is set so the model 
replicates premium elasticity targets from the literature. 
In this way, the model has the overall population change 
insurance enrollment decisions at a rate consistent with 
the research literature. Still, individuals within the model 
respond to changes in prices in a way that is consistent 
with their characteristics and their decisions observed 
in the data. This approach makes it easier to simulate 
novel policies consistently while calibrating the model 
to a wide range of real-world data, such as Medicaid and 
marketplace enrollment.
In this analysis, we provide all results in 2019 and a subset 
of results for 2022. Our current law — or baseline — 
scenario implicitly takes into account policy changes 
made since early 2017 that affected health insurance 
coverage for the 2018 open-enrollment period; our model 
is calibrated to 2018 state marketplace enrollment figures7 
and the most recent state-specific estimates of Medicaid 
enrollment.8 We also use state average marketplace 
premiums for the 2018 plan year. While estimates of 
nonmarketplace nongroup insurance enrollment are 
not currently available, HIPSM uses premium growth 
in marketplace bronze plans between 2017 and 2018 to 
estimate enrollment in unsubsidized nonmarketplace 
plans. The current-law scenario assumes the elimination 
of the federal mandate penalties but does not assume the 
expansion of the short-term, limited-duration plans in 
proposed regulations as they have yet to be made final.
The 2018 ACA penalty for being uninsured for a full year 
is equal to the maximum of 1) $695 per adult; half that 
amount for children and 2) 2.5 percent of household 
income. The penalty is capped at the national average 
premium of a marketplace bronze plan, and it is prorated 
for people uninsured for fewer than 12 months. There are 
a number of penalty exemptions.9 We assume that each 
state’s own penalty would use the state average premium 
of a marketplace bronze plan as the penalty cap, instead 
of the national average. We also assume that the state 
mandates would be as effective as the federal mandate.
The IRS has released state specific data on individual 
mandate penalty payments through 2015.10 HIPSM 
estimates of the number of households paying penalties 
by household adjusted gross income (AGI) level in each 
state correspond well with IRS data. However, HIPSM 
does not simulate monthly coverage decisions, so the 
model computes the amounts households would pay if 
members were uninsured for a full year. The IRS reports 
actual penalty collections and, as such, it reflects that some 
people are uninsured for only part of a year (and thus 
pay proportional penalties), the fact that some people 
receive hardship exemptions unrelated to individual 
data collected by household surveys like the ACS, as 
well as idiosyncrasies in the way that the law is being 
implemented. Consequently, we make adjustments to the 
level of our revenue estimates that reflect the differences 
between IRS and HIPSM full-year penalties per household 
for 2015 at each AGI level and state. These adjustments 
are applied to penalties computed using the tax brackets 
enacted by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.
Demand for uncompensated care for the uninsured is 
estimated in our model based on data from the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey–Household Component 
adjusted to the results of a detailed analysis of 
uncompensated care in 2013.11 The authors of that analysis 
found that the uninsured pay for about 30 percent of their 
health care out-of-pocket, with the remainder becoming 
uncompensated care. About 45 percent of uncompensated 
care is funded by the federal government through 
programs such as Medicaid Disproportionate Share 
Hospital (DSH) funding, Medicare DSH, and the Veterans 
Administration. About 24 percent is funded through state 
and local governments. The remainder is funded by health 
care providers themselves.
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3. New Jersey and Vermont have both recently 
passed legislation; Vermont’s legislation requires 
specification of the penalties during the course of 2019 
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